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LAS INSTITUCIONES INFLUENCIAN LAS PREFERENCIAS: 
EVIDENCIA EN UN EXPERIMENTO DE RECURSOS COMUNES 
 
Resumen  
En este artículo modelamos los efectos dinámicos del monitoreo y control 
externo en la explotación de un recursos de uso común. Al contrastar un modelo 
de preferencias con los resultados de datos experimentales encontramos que las 
instituciones afectan las preferencias. Con los datos empíricos intentamos 
resolver dos preguntas: el aumento y erosión posterior de la cooperación cuando 
los usuarios del recurso votan contra la imposición de una sanción, y el efecto 
positivo de las multas o sanciones bajas. Cuando las multas son rechazadas en 
una votación, la internalización de las normas sociales explica el aumento de la 
cooperación; las violaciones a las reglas (voluntarias o no), en conjunto con las 
preferencias por la reciprocidad, explican la erosión de la cooperación. Las 
multas o sanciones bajas estabilizan la cooperación al prevenir un espiral de 
reciprocidad negativa. 
Palabras clave: experimentos económicos en campo, recursos de uso común, 
cooperación, cumplimiento de regulaciones, regulación, preferencias sociales, 
normas sociales, modelos de aprendizaje. 




It is now widely agreed that social preferences, such as altruism, reciprocity, and 
guilt, are strong motives for behavior. Without a state to enforce property rights (or the 
disciplining hand of reputation) the selfish homo economicus engages in a war of all 
against all. Not the homo sapiens: social preferences help him avert chaos and 
cooperate. 
Economists usually assume away the influence institutions exert on social 
preferences. Often the assumption is harmless, but occasionally it may result in 
unexpected or even disastrous consequences. English health authorities learned this the 
hard way. They decided to promote blood donations by paying donors. Instead of 
increasing, blood donations plummeted (Titmuss 1969).
1 
Experiments indicate institutions affect social preferences. For example, Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000) studied day-care centers in Haifa, where a fine was imposed on 
parents who picked up their children late. Unexpectedly, tardiness more than doubled in 
those centers. A plausible explanation is that, by transforming a misdemeanor into a 
commodity that parents could buy cheaply, the fine eroded their sense of duty. Another 
example is Falk and Kosfeld’s (2004) experimental study of principal-agent relations. 
They gave principals the option to set a lower bound on the effort of agents. Falk and 
Kosfeld found that agents who were not restricted by their principals worked harder than 
those who were. Agents punished distrust. 
In this paper we explore the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the 
exploitation of a common pool resource (CPR).
2 As the previous evidence suggests, 
external enforcement may change the preferences of players. Thus, we begin by 
developing a model of CPR games that captures that possibility. The ingredients of the 
model are: 
                                                 
1 See Bowles (1998, 2005) for an extensive discussion of endogenous preferences and their policy 
implications. 
2 In a CPR game each player chooses privately how many tokens she will extract from a common pool. A 
player’s material payoff depends positively on the number of tokens she extracts and negatively on the 
aggregate level of extraction. Thus, individual and social interest conflict.  
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1.  Heterogeneous preferences. We distinguish three types of players: (i) selfish, 
who only care about their own material payoffs; (ii) unconditional cooperators, 
who feel guilty when they violate a social norm; (iii) conditional cooperators, who 
experience guilt with an intensity that declines when others violate the norm. 
2.  State-dependent preferences. When institutions change, player types may 
change as well. Institutions comprise such things as the enforcement of a norm 
by an external authority. 
3.  Stochastic behavior. A player will choose with higher probability those actions 
that give her a higher expected utility. 
4.  Adaptive expectations. Each player has an estimate of how much her peers will 
extract from the common pool, and updates that estimate as she observes what 
they actually do. 
Next, we fit our model to experimental data. In our experiment, groups of five 
persons played a CPR game twenty times. In some treatments the experimenter fined 
players he caught extracting more than one token (he applied the fines in private to 
prevent shame from affecting behavior). Some groups were treated with a high fine, 
other groups with a low one. Both fines induced high levels of cooperation. The effect of 
the high fine accorded with our expectations. The deterrence power of the low fine, by 
contrast, could not be justified by any reasonable parameterization of selfish 
preferences. Even more surprising was what happened when the experimenter 
proposed the sanction mechanism to the players but they voted against it. Extraction fell 
sharply at first, and then cooperation slowly unraveled back to its original low level.
3 One 
may infer the norm was internalized by some players even when it was not enforced. 
Without enforcement, moralization seemed to vanish over time. 
                                                 
3  Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) and Cárdenas (2000) also find unraveling in CPR games. The 
unraveling of cooperation has been reported in public good experiments as well. The earliest reports are in 
Kim and Walker (1984), and in Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985). See Fehr and Gaechter (2000) for a more 
recent treatment of the subject.  
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Fitting our model to the experimental data we find that most selfish players 
internalize the norm (i.e. they adopt a cooperative type) after the experimenter 
prescribes extracting one token. We also find that fewer people internalize the norm 
when it is enforced: it is as if enforcement relieved people from the guilt of infringement. 
A similar effect was observed by Gneezy and Rustichini. In their experiment, the 
imposition of a fine alleviated the parent’s guilty feelings. But, as parents knew 
beforehand that it was their duty to pick up their children on time, the prescriptive effect 
was absent. The result was a crowding out of cooperation. In our experiment, both 
effects act simultaneously. The prescriptive effect dominates the guilt relief effect, so 
cooperation crowds in. 
Finally, our study reveals that a player who cooperates conditionally under no 
fine is likely to cooperate unconditionally when a fine is in force. This is probably 
because the fine relieves her of the desire to retaliate against uncooperative players in 
the only way she can: by ceasing to cooperate herself.
4 
Our findings solve the two puzzles in the experimental results: the increase and 
later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and 
the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, moralization explains 
the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal 
preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines, on the other hand, induce players to 
cooperate irrespective of the behavior of their peers. A spiral of negative reciprocation is 
prevented and, as a result, cooperation becomes stable. 
                                                 
4 Andreoni (1995) advanced a similar hypothesis in the context of public good games.  
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2.  A MODEL OF COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES 
N  persons play a finitely repeated common pool resource (CPR) game. The 
game is repeated T times. At the beginning of each round, every player decides privately 
how many tokens to extract from a common pool; the minimum being one token, and the 
maximum  max x  tokens. Let  max {1,..., } it xx ∈  be the number of tokens player  {1,..., } iN ∈  
takes from the common pool in round  {1,..., } tT ∈ . 
A player’s payoff from extraction depends positively on the number of tokens she 
extracts and negatively on the aggregate level of extraction. Denote by  (, ) it it x x π −  player 
i’s payoff from extraction in round t,  where 
1
1 it jt N ji x x − − ≠ = ∑ .  Function  (, ) it it x x π −   is 
increasing in  it x   and decreasing in  it x− .  The sum of the payoffs of all players is 
maximized when they all extract the minimum amount (one token). 
Assume that the social norm is to extract one token. At the end of each round, an 
external authority inspects each player with probability [0,1) t p ∈ .  If the authority 
discovers that a player violated the social norm, he fines that player with an amount 
0 t f ≥   for every token she extracted in excess of one (the authority then casts the 
collected fine into the sea). Thus, the expected material payoff of player i in round t is 
(, ) ( 1 ) it it t t it xx p f x π − −⋅ − . 
There are three types of players: selfish (S), unconditional cooperators (UC), and 
conditional cooperators (CC). A selfish player derives utility only from her own 
consumption. An unconditional cooperator also enjoys consumption, but feels guilty 
when she extracts more than the amount prescribed by the norm, an idea we borrow 
from Bowles and Gintis (2002). Finally, a conditional cooperator enjoys consumption and 
feels guilty when she infringes the norm, though her guilt diminishes as group extraction 
increases. Conditional cooperators relate our model to those of reciprocal preferences, 
such as Rabin’s (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004). Fischbacher, 
Gaechter and Fehr (2004) report conditional cooperation is the most common behavior 
in one-shot public goods games, and that suggests it may also be common in CPR  
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games. The effect of diminishing guilt on norm compliance was recently explored by Lin 
and Yang (2005). 
Let  (, ,) it it it ux x θ −  be the utility function of player i in round t when she is of type 
{S,UC,CC} it θ ∈ . We define  (, ,) it it it ux x θ −  as follows: 
1m a x 2
max max
(, ,) (, ) ( 1 )
11
I( S) 1 I( CC) ,
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where  max 880 π =  is the maximum material payoff a player may obtain in one round,  1 β  
and  2 β   are positive constants, and function I( ) s  is 1 if statement s is true, and 0 
otherwise. This means that an unconditional cooperator that extracts  max x   tokens 
experiences guilt equivalent to  1 β  times  max π . A conditional cooperator feels as guilty as 
an unconditional one, provided everybody else abides by the norm and extracts one 
token.  If  2 1 β >   and aggregate extraction is high, a conditional cooperator will enjoy 
violating the norm. 
We allow a player’s type to depend on institutions. We shall postpone the 
definition of institutions until the next section. For now, bear in mind that institutions may 
comprise such things as the enforcement of a norm by an external authority, and that 
institutions may change over time. Each player is born a certain type (S, UC, or CC), and 
she may only switch types when institutions change. If we denote the institution in force 
during round t in round t as t ω , that means that  (1 ) it i t θ θ − =  unless  1 tt ω ω − ≠ . Denote as 
q( | ) θ ω   the probability that an individual will become type  θ   at the beginning of 
institutional regime ω . 
Player i will choose with higher probability those actions that give her a higher 
expected utility. Let  it ε  be her expectation of how much other players will extract in 
round t. The probability that player i will extract x tokens on round t is a logistic function  
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of her expected utilities: 
max
1
exp ( , , )
() ,














where  0 λ ≥  represents her tendency to maximize. If  0 λ = , the player will choose all 
extraction levels with equal probability. As  λ  approaches infinity, the player will tend to 
extract with probability one the number of tokens that maximizes her utility. 
Finally, player i updates her estimate of how much others will extract as she 
observes what they actually do. Player i’s expectations follow an adaptive process: 
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where [0,1] φ ∈  measures the persistence of expectations, and () ε ω  is an exogenous 
initial expectation. Initial expectations depend on ω  because a change in institutions 
may induce a change in what players expect. Stochastic choice combined with adaptive 
learning make our model a close cousin of Camerer and Ho’s (1999) EWA learning 
model. Our work is also linked to Janssen and Ahn’s (2003), who fit an EWA learning 
model to the results of two public good experiments. They find that heterogeneous 
preferences are essential to account for their experimental evidence. 
The steady state of  t x , the mean extraction level of the group in round t, has one 
important property. If there are no conditional cooperators in a group,  t x  has a unique 
stable steady state. But, if enough conditional cooperators are added to the mix, the 
reciprocal nature of their preferences may cause a second steady state to emerge (a 
feature shared by other models of reciprocal preferences, like Rabin’s [1993], and Lin 
and Yang’s [2005]). The intuition is simple: if  conditional  cooperators  expect  group  
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extraction to be low, they will be inclined to extract few tokens. On the other hand, if they 
expect a high group extraction, conditional cooperators will tend to extract many tokens. 
Hence, there will be two attracting poles of self-fulfilling expectations: one where players 
cooperate a lot, and another with little cooperation.  
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3.  A COMMON POOL RESOURCE EXPERIMENT 
In our common pool resource (CPR) experiment all subjects were adult villagers 
from five communities in Colombia. The communities exploited a common resource, 
such as fish or water. To control for the effect of kin altruism, no two members of the 
same household were admitted into the same experimental group. 
Here we briefly describe the experiment and discuss its results.
5 
3.1 Experimental  design 
Groups of five persons ( 5 N = ) play the CPR game of the previous section. The 
game is repeated twenty times ( 20 T = ), and the players know the number of repetitions 
beforehand. In each round every player decides privately how many tokens to extract 
from a common pool; the minimum being one token, and the maximum, eight ( max 8 x = ). 
The experimenter then informs players of the aggregate level of extraction, but does not 
reveal individual levels. Player i’s payoff from extraction in round t is given by 
2 5
( , ) 800 40 80 .
2
it it it it it x xx x x π − − =+ −−  
A simple calculation shows that a player maximizes her material payoff by extracting 
eight tokens. The aggregate payoff, on the other hand, is maximized when each player 
extracts only one. After the final round players cash their tokens. Prizes range between 
one and two days’ wages. 
At the end of round 10 the experimenter may introduce the following sanction 
mechanism: after each round he will randomly inspect one player; if he discovers that 
the player took more than one token, he will fine her in private. The experimenter may 
force the sanction mechanism on the players, or let them vote on it. In either case, he 
first explains to the players that having a fine is in their interests because it discourages 
                                                 
5 See Cárdenas (2004) for a detailed description of the experiment.  
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extracting more than one token, and because when everybody extracts only one token 
the material welfare of each player is maximized. 
We identify four institutions: 
NF:   No fine has ever been imposed on, or approved by, the players. 
HF:   A high fine regime is in force. 
LF:   A low fine regime is in force. 
RF:   A fine regime was proposed to, and rejected by the players. 
We do not distinguish between fines imposed by the experimenter and fines 
approved by player vote, because the distinction made no difference to the behavior of 
the players.
6 Since the experimenter may affect the preferences of players when he 
proposes a fine and they vote against it, we do distinguish between the no fine (NF) and 
the rejected fine (RF) regimes. 
Let  () f ω  be the fine in force when the institution is ω : 
0i f  { N F , R F }










The expected material payoff of player  i  in round  t  is therefore 
1
5 (, ) () ( 1 ) it it t it xx f x π ω − −⋅ − , where 
1
5  is the probability she will be inspected. 
Sixty-four groups of players received one of four different treatments: 
Control: (8 groups) The institution is NF for all twenty rounds. 
                                                 
6 We performed two Kruskall-Wallis tests on the hypothesis that mean extraction levels are the same under 
voted fines and under externally-imposed fine regimes. The test for high fines produced a p-value of 0.78. 
The test for low fines produced a p-value of 0.80.  
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High fine: (14 groups) The institution is NF for the first ten rounds, and HF for 
the last ten rounds. 
Low fine: (26 groups) The institution is NF for the first ten rounds, and LF for the 
last ten rounds. 
Rejected Fine: (16 groups) The institution is NF during the first ten rounds, and 
RF for the last ten rounds. 
     The standard prediction for this version of the CPR game is its subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the predictions for each institution. According to the 
predictions, only a high fine should have enough deterrence power to reduce individual 
extraction to its socially optimal level. Note that the equilibrium levels of extraction are 
close to, or coincide with, either the minimum or the maximum number of tokens that 
players are allowed to extract. This is intended to reduce the confusion that may arise 
among players if the optimal levels of extraction were interior solutions. Also, in the case 
of the low fine and the rejected fine institutions, the equilibrium extraction levels are far 
above the socially optimal level (one token). Thus, if one observes players complying 
with the social norm, one should feel less inclined to deem their compliance a mistake. 
Institution Predicted  extraction 
No fine  8 
High Fine  1 
Low Fine  6 
Rejected Fine  8 
  Table 1: Predicted levels of extraction.   
3.2  Results of the CPR experiment 
Figure 1 displays the aggregate behavior of players under each treatment. Note 
that: 
1.  Groups start at low levels of cooperation, extracting about 4.5 tokens on average. 
The mean level of extraction remains fairly constant during the first 10 rounds. In  
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the control treatment, extraction stays around 4.5 tokens until the end of the 
game. 
2.  Under all treatments other than the control, cooperation increases on round 11. 
The social optimum, however, is never reached. Nonetheless, extraction falls 
even when the players vote against the fine. 
3.  Cooperation remains high after round 11 only when a fine, be it high or low, is in 






































Figure 1: Experimental results, aggregate behavior. 
Compare the results of the experiment with the predictions of Table 1. According 
to the predictions, initial extraction levels should be 60% higher than they actually are. 
Under the high fine, extraction should drop to one. Instead, it stays over two. We 
expected a low fine to exert little deterrence. However, the low fine and the high fine 
work almost as well. A rejected fine should have no effect whatsoever, but surprisingly it 
has. 
Table 2 shows mean extraction levels under each institution, along with group 
and  individual deviations from the mean. The high individual deviations suggest that 
players randomize or experiment.  
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 Institution 
  No fine  High fine  Low Fine  Rejected fine 
Mean extraction  4.6 2.3 2.7 3.7 
Group deviation  2.3 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Average individual dev.  1.8 1.0 1.2 1.8 
Table 2: Summary statistics from the CPR experiment. 
Figure 2 shows histograms of individual extraction levels under different 
treatments. Under both fine treatments extraction is concentrated in the vicinity of one 
token. The histogram representing the no fine treatment is almost flat. If all players were 
identical, that would imply that they choose strategies completely at random, as if 
indifferent to material payoffs. A complementary explanation for the flatness is that 
players are heterogeneous along the moral dimension: some feel strongly that they 
should not take more than one token; others have no qualms and maximize their 
material payoff by taking eight. Also note how the histograms that represent the rejected 
fine treatment get flatter on rounds 15 and 20, as cooperation deteriorates.  
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Figure 2: Experimental results, distribution of individual extraction levels. 
The unraveling process is better understood by examining, one by one, the 
groups that rejected a fine. Figure 3 shows four such groups. Group 1 extracts a high 
amount from the first period until the end. Groups 2, 3, and 4 initially extract a low 
amount, but only group 4 cooperates until the last round. The most common pattern of 
behavior is represented by groups 2 and 3: both start by cooperating, but somewhere 
along the way they abruptly cease cooperating (first group 2 and later group 3). The 
smooth, concave line representing the rejected fine treatment in Figure 1 results from 















































































REJECTED FINE, t = 11
REJECTED FINE, t = 15
REJECTED FINE, t = 20 
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4.  MODEL ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION 
We used maximum-likelihood to estimate the parameters of our model:  λ ,  1 β , 
2 β ,  φ , ( ) ε ⋅ , and q( | ) ⋅⋅ (see the Appendix for a detailed account of the estimation  
procedure). Recall that  λ  is the players’ tendency to maximize,  1 β  and  2 β  determine 
the social preferences of cooperators, ( ) ε ω  is the initial expectation of players under 
institution ω , constant φ  measures the persistence of expectations, and q( | ) θ ω  is the 
probability that an individual will become type θ  at the beginning of institutional regime 
ω . We based our estimations on the outcomes of the first 19 rounds of play, and left the 
final round to test the predictive accuracy of our model. 
To simplify estimation, we made two assumptions regarding initial expectations: 
1. If {NF,HF,LF} ω∈ , ( ) ε ω  coincides with a stable steady state of 
1
N
ti t i x x
= =∑  
under institution  ω . Two conditions must hold for () ε ω  to be a stable steady 
state. First, the average level of player extraction when they expect others to 





exp ( , [ ], )
(|) () 0










λε ω θ =
=





Second, the derivative of the left hand side of the equation with respect to  () ε ω  
must be negative. 
2.  If  RF ω = , ( ) ε ω  is a convex combination of the stable steady states of  t x . 
The first assumption is justified by the fact that mean extraction levels remain 
fairly constant through all rounds under the no fine, high fine and low fine institutions 
(see Figure 1). With assumption number two we intend to capture the confusion that may  
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arise among players when there is more than one steady state (as Figure 3 suggests). 
Table 3 displays the estimated values of λ ,  1 β ,  2 β , and φ . Table 4 displays the 
estimated distribution of types, q( | ) ⋅ ⋅ , under each institution. Finally, Table 5 displays 
the estimated initial expectations. 
Parameter Estimate  Parameter Estimate 
λ   0.0030 
(0.0007) 
1 β   4.00 
(2.45) 
φ   0.50 
(0.03) 
2 β   4.00 
(0.00) 
Table 3: Estimated parameters:λ ,  1 β ,  2 β , and φ . Standard errors in parentheses.     
  Institution (ω ) 

















































Table 4: Estimated distribution of types, q( | ) θ ω . Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Institution (ω ) 
  No fine  High fine  Low Fine  Rejected 
fine 
() ε ω   4.7 2.0 2.4 2.2 
Stable steady states  4.7  2.0  2.4  1.7; 5.8 
Table 5: Estimated initial expectations and implied stable steady states. 
Perhaps the most striking result is the effect the institutional environment has on 
the distribution of types (Table 4). Under the no fine institution, only 12% of the players 
are cooperative. When a fine (high or low) is in force, the percentage rises to 80%, and  
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to 98% when the players reject a fine. Also, our results reveal that the enforcement of 
the norm induces more players to cooperate unconditionally: unconditional cooperators 
are 30% when a fine is rejected, and approximately 60% when a fine (high or low) is in 
force.
7 We hypothesize that fines relieve the cooperative player of the desire to retaliate 
against uncooperative ones in the only way she can: by ceasing to cooperate herself. 
Table 5 also shows the stable steady states of  t x   implied by the estimated 
parameters under each institutional environment. There is a unique stable steady state 
under the no fine, high fine and low fine institutions. That explains why players subject to 
those institutions rapidly cluster around the long run value of  t x : where equilibria are 
unique, there is little scope for confusion. On the other hand,  t x  has two stable steady 
states when players vote against the imposition of a fine. In that scenario, the 
intervention of the experimenter at the end of round 10 plays two complementary roles: 
moralizing players and coordinating expectations. In Schelling’s (1960) terms, the 
experimenter makes the low extraction equilibrium a focal point
8. The unraveling of 
cooperation is the transition from the high cooperation equilibrium to the low cooperation 
one. 
Our findings solve the two puzzles in the experimental data: the increase and 
later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and 
the high deterrence power of low fines. When players reject a fine, the internalization of 
the social norm “extract only one token” explains the increased cooperation; violations 
(accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the unraveling. Low 
fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation: when the 
norm is enforced, cooperation tends to be unconditional, and that eliminates the high 
extraction steady state that arises when the norm is prescribed but not enforced. 
Because the imposition of a low fine may moralize selfish players and induce 
                                                 
7 These results are robust. We made 100 bootstrap estimations of the model, taking each group history as 
an independent observation. In all estimations we found that:  q(S| NF) q( | ) θ ω >  for all  {HF,LF,RF} ω∈ , 
q(S| RF) q( | ) θ ω <  for all  {NF,HF,LF} ω∈ , and q(CC| RF) q(CC| ) ω >  for all  {HF,LF} ω∈ . 
8 McAdams and Nadlery (2005) study coordination in a hawk-dove game. They find, as we do, that 
externally imposed norms signal focal points.  
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unconditional cooperation, the “fine enough or don't fine at all” policy prescription of Lin 
and Yang (2005) must be qualified. 
To test the descriptive accuracy of our model, we simulated each treatment 500 
times, using the estimated parameters as inputs. Figure 4 displays the aggregate 
behavior of players under each treatment, actual and simulated. Table 6 shows mean 
extraction levels under each institution, along with group and individual deviations from 
the mean; the table pairs actual and simulated values. Figure 5 compares the actual and 
simulated histograms of individual extraction. The results of the experiment and the 
output of the simulation are extremely similar. Our model provides good account of the 
player's behavior, at both the group and the individual level. 
 Institution 
    No fine  High fine  Low Fine  Rejected 
fine 
Actual  4.6 2.3 2.7 3.7  Mean extraction 
Sim.  4.7 2.1 2.6 3.6 
Actual  2.3 1.9 2.1 2.3  Group deviation 
Sim.  2.4 1.9 2.3 2.9 
Actual  1.8 1.0 1.2 1.8  Average individual 
deviation 
Sim.  2.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 
Table 6: Summary statistics, actual and simulated, from the CPR experiment.  
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Figure 4: Mean levels of extraction, actual and simulated. 
a) No fine. 
c) Low fine. 
b) High fine. 







































Figure 5: Distribution of individual levels of extraction, actual and simulated. 
a) No fine. 


































b) High fine. 

































Next, we re-estimated our model subject to the restriction that preferences are 
not state-dependent ( i.e. q( | NF) q( |HF) q( |LF) q( |RF) θ θθθ = ==,  for all 
{S,UC,CC} θ ∈ ).
9  Using a likelihood ratio test we were able to reject, at a 99% 
confidence level, the hypothesis that the distribution of types does not change across 
treatments.
 10 We also simulated the restricted model, using estimated parameters as 
inputs, and it was unable to accurately mimic the experimental evidence (see Figure 4).  
Finally, we used our model and the restricted model to predict the amount 
extracted by each of the 320 experimental subjects in the last round of play. To predict 
the extraction of one player, we used the posterior probability of that player being of type 
{S,UC,CC} θ ∈  given the priors in q( | ) θ ω , and the behavior of the player and of the 
other members of his group during the first 19 rounds of play. Table 7 displays the mean 
prediction errors for both models under each institution. Our model outperformed the 
restricted model in all scenarios. We conclude that, in our CPR experiment, institutions 
influenced the social preferences of players. 
 Institution 
  No fine  High fine  Low Fine  Rejected fine
Our model  0.75  0.71  0.68  0.86 
Restricted model  0.81  0.78  0.79  0.92 
Table 7: Mean errors of prediction for our model and for a model without state-
dependent preferences. 
                                                 
9 Estimated parameters for the restricted model:  0.003 λ = ,  1 4.5 β = ,  2 4.25 β = ,  0.5 φ = , 
q(S|NF) q(S|HF) q(S|LF) q(S|RF) 11% ==== ,
q(UC| NF) q(UC| HF) q(UC| LF) q(UC| RF) 29% ==== ,  (NF) 5.7 ε = ,  (HF) 1.7 ε = ,  (LF) 1.8 ε = , 
(RF) 2.2 ε = . 
10 The log-likelihoods of the unrestricted and restricted models are  11467,14 U = − L  and  12202.57 R =− L . 
The likelihood ratio statistic is 
2
6 2( ) 1470.86 (.99) 16.81 UR χ −= > = LL ,   so we reject the hypothesis. 
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5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Authorities may influence social preferences when they prescribe and enforce 
social norms. We found, in a CPR experiment, that the external imposition of a norm 
affected preferences in two ways. 
First, by moralizing players. A speech by the experimenter sufficed to induce 
players to cooperate. How? By sowing in them the seed of guilt. Aristotle argued in his 
Nichomachean Ethics that effective laws worked by inculcating habits in citizens, that is, 
by moralizing them.
11 Our results remind us that his argument is still relevant today. 
Second, our model revealed that the enforcement of the norm affected the nature 
of moral sentiments. If the norm was enforced, players tended to comply with it 
irrespective of how others behaved. But if enforcement was absent, players conditioned 
their compliance on the good behavior of their peers. 
Our results also bring attention to the dynamic effects of enforcement. 
Conditional cooperation makes compliance fragile: a single rotten apple may spoil the 
whole box (and the addition of many good apples cannot restore it). In the experiment, a 
small fine sufficed to stabilize cooperation by making more players cooperate 
unconditionally, preventing the spread of moral degradation. Consider the implications 
for governmental corruption. Corrupt officers are hard to detect, so the expected 
punishment is often small compared to the potential gains from corruption. The 
occasional jailing of corrupt officers may nonetheless stabilize moral behavior. Weak 
enforcement may prevent officers from thinking “everybody else is doing it, so why can't 
we?” 
Further research is needed to determine when the enforcement of a norm will 
shield moral behavior from resentment or from “bad examples.” For instance: sanctions 
were weakly enforced in our experiment, but they were fair. If some commoners were 
made immune to punishment, punishment might cease to quench feelings of revenge; it 
would no longer serve to stabilize cooperation. Similarly, even if few people are beyond 
the reach of the law, the law may lose its effectiveness. 
                                                 
11 The word moral stems from Latin moralis, meaning custom.  
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The way a low fine sustains cooperation may be analogous to the way the yellow 
card keeps the peace on a football field. Without the card, violence escalates after the 
first kick to the shin; it makes no difference if the kick was intentional or accidental. 
Perhaps the card gives players the sensation that bad behavior does not always go 
unpunished, and that suppresses the impulse to seek their own justice. Being close 
substitutes for reciprocation, low fines and yellow cards may sometimes stabilize norm 
compliance in a world of feeble social order.  
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
Here we describe how we estimated the parameters of our model and its version 
without state-dependent preferences. First, we grilled the parameter space and restricted 
the search to that grill (see Table 8).  
Parameter Grill 
λ   0.0005,  0.0010,…,  0.0175,  0.0200 
1 β ,  2 β   0.25,  0.50,…,  9.75,  10.00 
φ   0.00,  0.25,  0.5,  0.75,  1.00 
q( | ) θ ω   0.00,  0.01,…,  0.99,  1.00 
() ε ω   1.0,  1.1,…,  7.9,  8.0 
Table 8: Parameters grill. 
  We imposed three more restrictions to the candidate estimates of the parameter 
vector  [ ] 12 , , , , q (|) , (|) λβ β φ ε Θ = ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅ . These restrictions are: 
1.  If {NF,HF,LF} ω∈ , ( ) ε ω  coincides with a stable steady state of 
1
N
ti t i x x
= =∑  
under institution ω . 
2.  If  RF ω = ,  () ε ω  is a convex combination of the stable steady states of  t x . 
3.  The candidate parameter vector should be able to reproduce the unravelling of 
cooperation under the rejected fine institution. To verify this restriction, each 
candidate parameter vector to simulate the rejected fine institution 500 times. We 
then checked that the simulated mean levels of extraction over ten rounds of play 
were within the 99% confidence intervals calculated from the experimental data 
(the confidence intervals are displayed in Figure 4d). 
In the case of the model without state-dependent preferences, we added an 
additional restriction: that q( | NF) q( | HF) q( |LF) q( |RF) θ θθθ = ==,  for all  
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{S,UC,CC} θ ∈ . 
Finally we evaluated the log-likelihood function of the model with every candidate 
parameter vector that satisfied the aforementioned restrictions, and selected the 
parameter vector that produced the higher value. 